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ABSTRACT

Specialization:

This paper attempts to examine the impact of IMF programs and subsequent policy
conditions from a gender lens1. We argue that the IMF’s orthodox adjustment policies
deteriorate the development outcomes of women disproportionately, mainly due to
undermining recipient states’ expenditure capacity on female-dominated work and
service sectors. Consequently, women face hardships in managing their dual roles -in
both the market and the domestic spheres- which affects the efficiency of society's
productive and reproductive sectors. First, we detect the main macro and politicaleconomic determinants of IMF participation using a probit estimation. Second, we use
the predicted probabilities in stage one to conduct a Heckman selection procedure
between the participation in an IMF program and the observation of policy
conditionalities. Finally, we estimate the impact of the IMF conditionality on different
gendered outcomes. Our results indicate that a 1% increase in conditionality increases
female unemployment, maternal mortality rates, girls' secondary school drop-out rates,
and gender inequality by 1.1%, 6.7%, 6.8%, and 0.8% respectively. Furthermore, the
results of our extended model confirm the crucial role of different institutions that
protect women’s rights -including laws and conventions that prohibit gender-based
discrimination- in mitigating the adverse impacts of IMF policy conditions on gendered
outcomes.
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I. Introduction
As envisioned by the Bretton Woods (BW) Agreement, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was established in 1944 with the main mandate of safeguarding the stability and integrity of the
international financial system (IMF, 1997). The IMF provides financing to support countries
reduce their current account and fiscal deficits to manageable proportions in the medium term
through its Adjustment Lending (AL) programs. In return, fund recipient countries are obliged to
implement some policy reforms – referred to as “conditionalities”- designed and tailored to correct
their underlying BOP problems while maintaining the growth and development momentum (World
Bank, 1980). The IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) comprise a set of stabilization
policies that target primarily inflation control as well as the reduction of budget and external
balance deficits to attract private sector investment in the short run. This effect is achieved through
depressing domestic spending by imposing public expenditure cuts and contractionary
macroeconomic policies and devaluating the domestic currency. Subsequently, trade liberalization,
capital account liberalization, and the privatization of public services and state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) are phased in as structural adjustment policies that aim for achieving growth in the
productivity and competitiveness of exports in the long run (Berik and Rodgers, 2009).
However, the set of austerity policies imposed by SAPs is accused to be neo-classical
supply-side macroeconomic policies that lead to the reduction of domestic purchasing power and
welfare of the state in terms of rising inequalities and reduced employment. In effect, these policies
are expected to disproportionately hurt the most vulnerable social groups, including females
(Antrobus, 1993; Cagatay and Elson, 2000). Previous empirical literature tackling the gendered
effects of IMF’s orthodox reform programs arrive at a consensus on their adverse impacts on
educational, health, and overall equality outcomes of females (Saadatmand and Toma, 2008;
Pandolfelli et al, 2014; Stubbs et al, 2016; Chandra et al, 2018). These results can be mainly
attributed to the reduction of females’ access to assistive and affordable public services -including
health, educational and social services- as a result of public spending cuts and privatization policy
conditions (Antrobus, 1993). However, the literature remains inconclusive with regards to the
impact of SAPs on women’s economic outcomes as a result of two contradicting effects on female
labor force participation. On one side, trade liberalization policies lead to higher job creation for
females in low-skilled, low-paid jobs to increase export competitiveness (Cagatay and Ozler, 1995;
Cerutti, 2000; Erten and Metzger, 2019). In the counterargument, privatization and efficiencyenhancing policies might reduce women's opportunities for formal (and public) employment;
hence driving them out of the labor force (Saadatmand and Mcgrath, 2004; Saadatman and Toma,
2008).
This paper has two main contributions to the previous literature on SAPs and gendered
outcomes. First, we estimate the impact of IMF conditionalities on gendered outcomes, while
taking into consideration the selection bias between the participation of countries in IMF programs
and the observation of policy conditionalities. Up to our knowledge, previous papers have not
considered explicitly the heterogeneous policy context assigned by the IMF and have solely
focused on the impact of IMF participation on gendered outcomes (Saadatmand and Mcgrath,
2004; Saadatman and Toma, 2008; Pandolfelli et al, 2014). Second, we provide a comprehensive
analysis of the impact of IMF programs on gendered outcomes by incorporating four different
outcome variables that account for economic, health, educational and overall gender inequality,
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while previous papers have most considered two dimensions of the story (Saadatmand and
McGrath, 2004; Detraz and Peksen, 2016). It is also worth mentioning that this paper has introduced
the Gender Inequality Index as an outcome variable to validate that the impact of IMF policies spurs
gender inequalities in favor of males and not just deteriorate the development outcomes of the
whole recipient country’s population in an equal matter.
This paper aims to empirically test the impact of IMF programs and subsequent policies on
gendered outcomes, namely female unemployment rates, maternal mortality rates, secondary
school enrollment rates, and gender inequality. We employ a Heckman selection procedure using
a sample of 181 world countries between 1993 and 2018 to control for the selection bias between
a country's participation in IMF programs and the observation of policy conditionalities. Second,
we estimate the impact of the IMF conditionality on gendered outcomes.
Our results indicate a respective increase in female unemployment rates, maternal mortality
rates, girls’ school dropout rates, and overall gender inequality as a result of an increase in
conditionality. These results represent the minimal deterioration caused by IMF austerity policies
on female outcomes since the possibility of interdependence between the four considered
outcomes is not accounted for. Our estimates confirm the disproportionate impact of public
spending cuts on females as it increases their unpaid work burden, and limits their access to public
services and formal employment opportunities (Saadatmand and Toma, 2008; Pandolfelli et al,
2014; Stubbs et al, 2016; Chandra et al, 2018). Finally, the results of our extended model confirm
the crucial role played by different institutions that protect women's rights in mitigating the
negative impacts of IMF policy conditions on gendered outcomes.
The remainder of this paper can be classified into 6 main sections. Section 2 summarizes the
review of the literature on the topic. Section 3 presents some stylized facts. Section 4 details the
methodological framework employed in our econometric analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical
results. Section 6 presents some robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes and builds some
policy recommendations.

II. Literature Review
To address our main research question, it is crucial to demonstrate the link between macroeconomic
policies and gendered outcomes within the context of economic theory. We do the latter by
introducing the main insights of feminist theories and their main critiques of neoclassical
economic theories, including macro-theories of structural adjustment and economic reforms. In
the second subsection, we present some empirical validations of the feminist predictions about the
impact of austerity policies adopted by the IMF on different gendered outcomes.
i. Theoretical Background
Feminist economics mainly aims the introduction of a gender-aware perspective that re-thinks the
main assumptions of traditional economics. The main argument of feminist economics is that
gender is a crucial determinant of an individual's participation in the economy and that no
economic theory or policy has a neutral impact on both genders. Feminists contribute to the
orthodox critiques of neo-classical economic theories mainly by challenging the Homo
Economicus (rational man) assumption of the rational choice theory that attributes an individual’s
behavior solely to his material well-being and ignores the dualistic nature of different genders with
regards to physical and social constraints of privilege and sub-ordinance (Benhabib, 1993; Nelson,
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1993). Therefore, the field of feminist economics promotes the urgency of considering such social
stratifications in policymaking and analysis.
The second criticism directed by feminist economists to traditional economic theory is that
the latter restricts the definition of production to paid work activities in the market and stipulates
unpaid household activities under consumption or reproduction units. On the contrary, Feminist
theory argues that domestic tasks carried out by women such as childbearing, elderly care, or
domestic chores contribute to the household income by saving or providing the unpaid care services
necessary for the sustainability of out-of-home production. Therefore, the neo-classical definition
of production leads to the underestimation of women’s non-remunerated work and their real
contribution to household income (Beneria, 1982). Finally, Feminist theories highlight the
importance of the patriarchal structure of domestic work that lays the majority of the unpaid care
work burden on females, which in turn affects their ability to participate in the paid labor market
activities due to time constraints (Paltasingh and Lingam, 2014).
Following the oil crisis in the 1970s and the debt crisis in the 1980s, developing countries
increased their demand for SAPs that mainly aim at achieving export competitiveness through
trade and investment liberalization, privatization, and fiscal austerity. Since the early 1990s, a
growing body of feminist literature has emerged to emphasize the shortfalls of structural
adjustment policies imposed by international financing institutions on the gendered outcomes in
program participating countries.
In line with traditional orthodox reform theories, austerity policies adopted by lending
institutions usually endorse consumption cuts, in the form of public spending cuts, currency
devaluation, and privatization, as a method to achieve macro-economic stabilization. However,
feminist critiques of such theory highlight the importance of recognizing the intertwining
productive and reproductive roles of women to disentangle the impacts of IMF conditionalities on
different gender groups. For instance, Antrobus (1993) argues that cuts in public social
expenditures especially on health and education can affect women through different channels.
First, it deteriorates their economic autonomy and access to financial resources since female
workers dominate the social sphere of production. Secondly, it reduces their access to assistive and
affordable services vital to the performance of their domestic and paid-work tasks, and thus obliges
women to allocate more of their time to un-paid care services. Consequently, women face hardships
in managing their dual roles -in both the market and the domestic spheres- affecting the efficiency
and effectiveness of reproductive as well as the productive capacity of the society (Beneria, 1982).
In addition, spillover effects on girls’ education and fertility rates are possible leading to a vicious
inter-generational circle of poverty based on gender (Elson, 1991; Sen, 1999).
Furthermore, theoretical predictions of feminist economics argue that policies imposed by
the Fund fail to achieve gender-equitable outcomes due to the presence of three main biases
embedded in their reforms (Catagay and Elson, 2000). First, the exclusive focus of governments
on controlling inflation through the adoption of tight fiscal and monetary policies regardless of
their social costs refers to a “deflationary bias”. Under recessionary pressures, women are more
likely to lose their formal employment opportunities, and crowd into informal employment markets,
in which they dominate lower skill, lower hierarchy, and lower pay jobs. This leads eventually to
widening wage gaps and inequalities in the labor market. Moreover, higher interest rates - resulting
from a tight monetary policy- might hurt small-scale enterprise owners (who are disproportionately
women) with limited or no collateral by restricting their access to credit. Second, the "male-
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breadwinner bias" refers to another macro-economic entitlement failure made by SAPs in which
men are perceived as the primary breadwinners that provide for various independents in the nonmarket reproduction sphere through their market income. According to this bias, men are entitled
to decent jobs or opportunities in periods of economic recovery and women are either dependent
on their male breadwinner’s income or social transfers targeting the most vulnerable categories of
the society (Beneria et al, 2015). Finally, the "commodification bias" refers to the tendency of
privatized state-owned enterprises and services to eliminate inefficiencies and price distortions.
Privatization strategies in this regard resulted in reduced public employment opportunities for
females, and higher prices of public (health, educational and social) services, which in turn
increases the unpaid work burden on females and deteriorates their distributional outcomes.
In line with export promotion policies endorsed by international institutions, trade
liberalization policies represent a cornerstone of IMF reform programs. In the case of trade
openness, more job opportunities are created for women in the low-skilled, labor-intensive
manufacturing export sector to increase exports' competitiveness through exploiting females'
cheap supply of labor. Such a phenomenon is known as the "feminization of labor". Although such
opportunities could enhance the educational and health outcomes of women, they tend to trap them
into low-paying low-quality jobs and further increase their vulnerability to financial shocks.
Finally, the adoption of high-skill technology manufacturing techniques might lead to women's
displacement or more explicitly, what is called the “de-feminization of labor” (Berik and Rogders,
2009).
In conclusion, feminist economics argues that in adjusting the composition of macropolicies, policymakers need to consider the severe effects of economic austerity measures on
women to avoid exacerbating the prevailing gender inequalities in economic, education, and health
aspects.
ii. Empirical Evidence
We classify the empirical studies that detect the impact of SAPs (including IMF programs) on
gendered outcomes into four main clusters of outcomes namely economic, health, educational and
overall inequality.
On the economic front, Cagatay and Ozler (1995) run a fixed effect panel estimation for a
cross-country dataset of 96 countries to estimate the impact of SAPs on the feminization of the
labor force in loan recipient countries. Results indicate that SAPs indeed lead to an increase in the
female ratio of workers in the labor force due to increased openness and export orientation of the
economy. Similar conclusions were reached by Cerutti (2000) in Latin America where labor
markets were feminized as a consequence of the structural adjustment reforms. Similarly, Erten
and Metzger (2019) estimate a positive and significant effect of currency devaluation on female
labor force participation with larger effects for countries with lower initial levels of income. These
findings indicate a U-shaped relationship between economic development and feminization of
labor where at earlier stages of development, undervaluation might boost economic opportunities
for women since the economy is usually specialized in low-skilled labor-intensive industries, while
at later stages of development technology-based –male-dominated- industries prevail in the
economy leading to the de-feminization of labor.
On the contrary, Saadatmand and McGrath (2004) present an alternative mechanism by
which IMF policies can affect the economic outcomes of women. The authors estimate a negative
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impact of SAPs on the reported female labor force participation rates in Latin America. This can be
attributed to the entry of females into informal labor markets, prevailing cultural preferences for
male employment, reduced employment in the public sector, and increased competition for formal
jobs.
In a similar context, Detraz and Peksen (2016) estimate the impact of IMF-induced policies
of privatization and their endeavors on political and economic instability on the level of respect
for women's rights in loan recipient countries. To control for the IMF's non-random selection of
lending, they employ a two-stage econometric model. Results show that the involvement in IMF
programs increases a country's probability of women's economic rights violation regardless of the
type of political regime or level of economic development in such a country, while it has no
significant impact on women’s political rights in recipient countries. These results are in line with
the author’s argument that austerity conditions of IMF lending undermine the government’s ability
to protect women’s economic rights in the context of private-sector profit maximization strategies.
From an educational standpoint, Stubbs et al (2006) contribute to the literature by
estimating the impact of both IMF participation and degree of conditionality on government
educational expenditures by employing a 3SLS estimation. Results estimate that exposure to an
additional condition results in a 0.05 percentage point decline in educational expenditure. On a
similar front, Saadatmand and Toma (2008) estimate a negative impact of adjustment programs on
female enrollment in primary and secondary schools due to the increased workload in the
household or the informal economy. Saadatmand and McGrath (2004) found similar results for
female secondary education in Latin American Countries.
For health outcomes, Pandolfelli et al (2014) conducted a cross-country analysis to test for
the impact of IMF SAPs on women’s health – proxied by maternal mortality rates- using data on
37 African countries for four-time points (1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005). The authors correct the
endogeneity of selection into an IMF program using a two-step Heckman procedure (Heckman,
1979) The findings indicate that recipient countries of IMF loans have higher maternal mortality
rates than non-recipients. These results can be further validated by Stubbs et al (2016) findings in
which a 0.24% decline in health spending per capita is estimated following one additional binding
IMF policy reform. This in turn leads to decreasing the access and affordability of health services
for pregnant women mainly due to the higher prices of private-sector medical services.
Furthermore, it weakens the state's capacity to invest in health thereby compromising the health
outcomes of the most vulnerable groups including women.
Our assessment of the empirical evidence on the gendered effects of key neoliberal reforms
imposed by the IMF confirms earlier hypotheses stated in feminist theories. Women and men
weather the storm of macroeconomic shocks differently, and women bear the lion’s share of losses
under SAPs. Consensus in the literature holds on the adverse effects of adjustment lending on
females’ health and educational outcomes (Pandolfelli et al, 2014; Stubbs et al, 2016). While the
literature remains inconclusive about their impact on female force participation, which might be
affected positively by policies that lead to the “feminization of labor” in labor-intensive lowskilled jobs (Cagatay and Ozler, 1995; Cerutti, 2000). Alternatively, the economic outcomes of
women can be negatively affected due to governments’ downsizing of expenditures and
privatization policies that increase females’ unpaid work burden and decrease their formal
employment opportunities. (Saadatmand and Mcgrath, 2004; Saadatmand and Toma, 2008)
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This paper contributes to the literature on SAPs and gendered outcomes two-fold. First,
none of the previously tackled papers takes into consideration the selection bias between countries'
participation in IMF programs and observation of conditionalities. Previous papers have not
considered explicitly the impact of the heterogeneous policy context assigned by the IMF on
gendered outcomes and have solely focused on whether a country is an IMF program participant
(Saadatmand and Mcgrath, 2004; Saadatman and Toma, 2008; Pandolfelli et al, 2014). Second,
we provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of IMF programs on gendered outcomes by
incorporating four different outcome variables that account for economic, health, educational, and
gender inequality, while previous papers have most considered two dimensions of the story
(Saadatmand and McGrath, 2004; Detraz and Peksen, 2016). In our analysis, we use the Gender
Inequality Index constructed in the 2010 Human Development Report by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). This index accounts for multiple dimensions that represent the
main forces of discrimination against women and girls comprising health, education, political
representation, and labor market participation, which up to our knowledge has not been used in
previous empirical work.

III. Stylized Facts
In this section, we present some stylized facts on our research question. We cluster our stylized
facts into two sub-sections including an analysis of IMF lending and policy conditions, followed
by a descriptive analysis of the relationship between IMF lending and subsequent policy conditions
on gendered outcomes in loan recipient countries.
i. IMF Lending and Policy Conditions
During our period of analysis, the IMF has approved 498 loans under its different lending facilities.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of IMF lending over time and signals the increased demand for IMF
loans following major global or regional economic crises. A positive trend for IMF lending can be
observed starting in the early 1990s with a peak of 34 loans in 1994. This coincides with the
introduction of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) by the IMF in 1986 -later replaced by the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) - to provide concessional loans for low-income
countries that were most adversely affected by the subsequent economic crises including the oil
crisis in 1970, the second oil crisis in 1979, the debt crisis in the 1980s. The second peak occurs
in 2010 at 28 loans following the global financial crisis in 2008. We expect the number of loans to
climax again after the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020.
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Figure 1
Evolution of IMF Lending over Time

Source: Constructed by the author using the MoNA database by the IMF.

The IMF has 8 different lending instruments that are tailored to meet the different needs
and circumstances of the lending countries (see Table A2 in Appendix for further details). Upon
disaggregating IMF loans by type of facility, we observe that the Extended Credit Facility (ECF)
is the most frequently used within our period of analysis with a percentage of 41.77% of total
loans, followed by Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) and Extend Fund Facility (EFF) that occupy
38.35% and 11.45% consecutively as can be seen in Figure 2. Our main analysis focuses on the
IMF’s Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Stand-By Agreement (SBA) which constitute the two
main IMF non-concessional lending tools and around 50% of total IMF lending (Barro and Lee,
2005)2.

2

We re-estimate the model using a participation dummy including both concessional and non-concessional loans and
obtain similar quantitative results for the outcome equation
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Figure 2
Disaggregation of Loans by Type of Facility (1993-2018)

Source: Constructed by the author using the MoNA database by the IMF.

Figure 3 ranks the top 10 loan recipient countries during the period of analysis. It is worth
mentioning that 6 out of the 10 top recipient countries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, while
the other 4 are located in Europe and Central Asia indicating a strong regional spillover of
economic difficulties and lending frequency.
Figure 3
The Intensity of Lending in Top 10 Recipient Countries

Source: Constructed by the author using the MoNA database by the IMF.

As previously mentioned, IMF loans are a two-way deal between the Fund and the recipient
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country’s government. In exchange for financial assistance provided by the IMF, the home
government has to agree with the Fund on some policy reforms to adjust the economy and
overcome the main obstacles that led the country to seek assistance in the first place.
Conditionalities can take several forms comprising Prior Actions (PAs), Quantitative Performance
Criteria (QPCs), Indicative Targets, and Structural Benchmarks (see Table A3 in Appendix).
As can be seen in Figure 4, the IMF assigns a heterogeneous degree of conditionality across
regions. Moreover, it can be observed that the regions with the largest share of loans (SSA, Europe,
Central Asia, and LACs) are not the highest in terms of average conditionalities per loan.
Figure 4
Disaggregation of IMF Loans and Conditionalities by Region

Source: Constructed by the author using the MoNA database by the IMF.

Figure 5
Disaggregation of IMF Conditionalities by Type (1993-2018)

Source: Constructed by the author using the MoNA database by the IMF

ii. IMF and Gendered Outcomes: Stylized Facts
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IMF’s first female head, Christine Lagarde, addressed a speech at the 2013 Annual Meetings
Plenary Session of the IMF in which she stressed the worrisome of IMF about the lack of progress
in achieving gender equality around the globe. During her speech, she pledged that "the IMF will
work with its member countries to enable women to contribute fully to global economic growth
and prosperity" (Detraz and Peksen, 2018). In this subsection, we analyze some gendered
outcomes in close parenthesis with IMF imposed policy conditions presented in the last subsection.
As clearly observed in Figure 6, the Gender Inequality Index has declined over the last
decade in all regions. However, regions ranking the lowest in terms of enhanced gender inequality
are the ones assigned the highest average conditionalities per loan (see Figure 4) by the IMF such
as East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, and MENA (except for SSA).
Figure 6
Evolution of GII by Region (2010-2018)

Source: Constructed by the author using Human Development Reports (2010-2018.

Plotting the degree of conditionality against maternal mortality ratio and enrollment rates
for girls further validates the adverse effect of SAPs on females' human capital indicators. Figures
7 (a) and (b) show a positive association between the number of conditionalities and maternal
mortality rates at the country level, and a negative association with primary enrollment rates of
females, which comes in line with previous literature findings (Pandolfelli et al, 2014; Stubbs et
al, 2016).
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Figures 7 (a) and (b)
Association between Degree of Conditionality and Human Capital Outcomes

(a)

(b)

Source: Constructed by the author using MoNA and WDI databaseS.

Figures 8 (a) and (b)
Association Between the Degree of Conditionality and Labor Market Indicators

(a)

(b)

Source: Constructed by the author using MoNA, UNDP, and WDI databases.

Figures 8 (a) and (b) elaborate a clear statement of deteriorated female outcomes by IMF
policy conditions indicated by a positive relationship between the degree of conditionality and
both the female unemployment rates and the gender inequality index. This can be mainly
interpreted as a narrower opportunity window for females to be recruited in or even stay employed
in their decent and formal employment opportunities at times of structural adjustment (Lundberg,
1985; Antrobus 1993; Beneria et al, 2015).
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Figure 9
Mean Health and Educational Expenditure by IMF Participation (1993-2018)

Source: Constructed by the author using MoNA and WDI databases.
Note: Health and education expenditures in the figure are computed as a percentage of GDP.

Finally, we compare the average health and educational expenditure across IMF participant
and non-participant countries. As can be observed in Figure 9, IMF non-participant countries have
higher educational (4.7%) and health (6.3%) expenditures compared to IMF participant countries
(3.9% and 5.9% respectively). This comes in line with the argument of undermined governments’
spending capacities as a consequence of the IMF austerity reforms (Stubbs et al, 2006; Stubbs et
al, 2016).

IV. IMF Loans’ Gendered Outcomes: Methodological Framework
We develop a cross-country dataset for 181 countries -including high, middle, and low incomecountries for the period from 1993 to 2018. We draw data for macro-economic, gender, and IMF
loans and conditionality variables from different reliable sources as shown in Table A1 in
Appendix.
In this section, we present our empirical strategy employed to detect the impact of IMF
loans and subsequent policy conditions on gendered outcomes, as follows:
Wit = βo+ β1IMFit + β2 Xit + μt + δi + εit

(1)

Where i and t represent country and year, W is the outcome of interest (female
unemployment rate, maternal mortality rate, secondary school enrollment rate of girls, and gender
inequality index), IMF is IMF participation dummy (or the number of conditionalities) for country
i and time t; X denotes a vector of covariates3 affecting gendered outcomes including GDP growth
rate, fertility rates, secondary school enrollment rates of girls, CEDAW ratification dummy, and
3

The secondary enrollment variable is excluded from the school enrollment outcome equation.
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law dummy. While μ is a set of year dummies, δ is a set of regional dummies and ε is the error
term.
Equation (1) fails to account for the non-random selection of participation in IMF
programs. In that regard, equation (2) takes into consideration the endogeneity of countries'
selection for IMF loans. The selection of countries depends on multiple macro-economic and
political-economic factors. Therefore, we adopt the political economy approach innovated by
Barro and Lee (2005) in an attempt to isolate the effects of IMF programs on gendered outcomes
from the borrowing countries' pre-existing conditions. To detect the main determinants of selection
into an IMF loan, equation (2) is estimated using a panel probit model as follows:
Iit = α + β Xit + γ Zit+ μt + εit

(2)

Where Iit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is an IMF program
participant in year t and 0 otherwise. On the right-hand side of equation (1), Xit is a vector of control
variables that comprise supply and demand-side factors that influence the approval of an IMF
program.
First, supply-side factors include IMF credit outstanding for all countries at year t (which
serves as a proxy for the international demand for IMF funds), while demand-side factors include
a country's quality of institutions -proxied by WGI’s government effectiveness index-, real GDP,
lagged foreign exchange reserves, current account balance, primary budget deficit, and
government consumption4 (Dreher and Vaubel, 2004).
The vector Zit comprises a set of excludable instruments that measure each country’s
political-economy connections to the IMF such as the IMF Quota of country i at time t and its
bilateral trade with the US and the major Western EU countries including Germany, France, and
United Kingdom (Barro and Lee, 2005). μt are year dummies to control for common effects of
external factors such as world interest rates.
Intuitively, the political-economy exclusion variables are mainly based on the fact that the
IMF is a bureaucratic and political entity. Therefore, decisions are affected by the relative influence
of its members (measured by the country’s quota in the IMF), and the economic proximity of
countries with the key stakeholders -referred to in this paper as “veto countries”- in the IMF’s
board of directors (Barro and Lee, 2005).
We argue for the validity of the political-economy variables as excludable instrumental
variables between IMF participation and conditionalities for four reasons. First, the used
instruments are influential for the IMF approval decision, especially for non-concessional lending
facilities under the General Resource Account (GRA) as borrowing countries might be noneligible for concessional loans and therefore approval of their loans would require a higher political
bargaining power. Second, it is important to note that loan amounts and policy conditions are
determined jointly –and in the first stage- by a country’s government and the IMF national
technical team in accordance with the country’s domestic macro-economic stance to ensure loan
repayment and program success. Consequently, the approval decision is taken in a second –and
4

We use one year lagged macro-economic indicators for two main reasons. First, to avoid the potential endogeneity
of contemporaneous variables to IMF participation and to account for the time inconsistency in IMF lending as the
current lending decision are based on previous macro-economic stances.

Published by Arab Journals Platform

90

Reem Ahmed, IMF Impact and Conditions: A Gender Lens

separate- stage by the Fund’s executive board once the agreed policy program and loan amounts
are received from the country’s government and domestic IMF technical team in a “letter of
intent”. Therefore, we can argue that the proposed instruments satisfy the exclusion criterion as
they affect the loan approval decision made by the international board of directors without directly
affecting the intensity of reforms agreed upon based on purely technical consultations on the
national level. Third, the proposed instruments surpass the econometric tests of instruments'
validity namely the under-identification, weak identification, and over-identification (SarganHansen) tests. Finally, the proposed instruments have been previously used in the literature as
excludable instruments for IMF participation (Barro and Lee, 2005; Detraz and Peksen, 2016).
We further incorporate the number of conditionalities (referred to as "degree of
conditionality") into our analysis in the realization of the heterogeneous policy content of IMF
programs imposed by the Fund on the lending countries, and their adverse impacts on governments'
capacity to protect gendered outcomes (Stubbs et al, 2006). However, conditionalities can only be
observed for countries currently participating in an IMF loan. The selection bias (si) between the
observance of IMF conditionalities and IMF participation can be indicated by:
If α + βXit + γZit = 1
Otherwise
For the above-mentioned reasons, we use a manual Heckman selection procedure
(Heckman, 1979) referred to in the literature as the two-part model. This method allows us to
control for the determinants of the assigned degree of conditionalities to lending countries as well
as rules out the possibility of incidental truncation –which might occur as conditionalities are only
observed for countries currently participating in an IMF loan- in our sample.
In a second stage, we use the predicted probability of IMF participation from (2) to
calculate the Inverse Mills ratio (ratio of the standard normal density and the standard normal
cumulative distribution function). This ratio is in turn regressed along with the same vector of
covariates (Xit) in (2) to estimate the determinants of the degree of conditionality assigned to a
country as follows:
Condit = α + βXit + λit IMR + μt + εit

(3)

The main macro-economic indicators of a country affect its assigned level of
conditionalities through two main channels. First, the better a country’s macro-economic stance,
the stronger its bargaining power for a lower number of policy conditions. Second, the IMF
technical team is more likely to assign a higher intensity reform program - and therefore a higher
number of conditions - to countries with less promising macro-economic indicators to ensure the
success of the reform program and minimize the risk of reimbursement default (Dreher and
Vaubel, 2004; Stubbs et al, 2006).
Our final stage uses the predicted conditionality from the Heckman procedure to estimate
the impact of IMF participation on health, education, economic and overall inequality of females
by employing a random-effect cross-country panel analysis, as follows:
Wit = βo + β1Pr(Condit) + β2Xit + μt + δi + εit (4)
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V. Empirical Results
i. Determinants of IMF Lending and Conditionalities
In this section, we present the results of the Heckman procedure conducted to control for the
selection bias between IMF participation and the degree of conditionality (Heckman, 1979).
Column 1 in Table 1 estimates the macro-economic and political-economic determinants
of IMF participation. Results reveal that a country's GDP, level of international reserves, primary
budget balance, and quality of institutions are the main determinants of a country's demand for
IMF participation. Intuitively, a country with a higher level of government effectiveness, real GDP,
foreign exchange reserves, or primary budget balance would most likely demand less participation
in IMF loans. Previous studies conclude the same macro-economic determinants of IMF
participation include foreign reserves, budget deficit, current account Balance, and GDP
(Przecaski and Vreeland, 2000; Barro and Lee, 2005; Fidrmue and Kostagianni, 2015; Detraz and
Peksen, 2016; Bird and Rowland, 2017). On the supply side, the probability of loan approval from
the IMF increases as a country’s economic proximity to the United States and the major Western
European Countries increases, and as its IMF quota -and subsequently its voting power in the IMFincreases. The positive impact of political-economy instruments is in line with the findings of
Barro and Lee (2005) and Detraz and Peksen (2016).
Column 2 in Table 1 estimates the determinants of the degree of conditionality assigned to
a country. Firstly, we note that the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is negative and significant
which signals the fact that countries with large negative conditionality estimates are not
participating in an IMF loan and that selection between the two variables exists. As for the main
determinants of IMF conditionality, results indicate that a country's real GDP, current account
balance, primary budget balance, and institutions strengthen a country's bargaining position for a
lower number of conditionalities. These results confirm the crucial role of a country's initial macroeconomic stance in negotiating more preferential lending terms – in the form of lower intensity
reform programs- with the IMF country team (Stubbs et al, 2006; Dreher and Vaubel, 2016).
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Table 1
Heckman Selection Estimation between IMF Participation and Conditionalities

Ln (GDP)
Ln reserves (-1)
Current Account (-1)
Primary Budget (-1)
Gov. consumption (-1)
Institutions
Ln (IMF credit-outstanding)
Ln (US trade)
Ln (EU trade)
IMF Quota
Constant

(1)

(2)

IMF participation

Conditionality

-0.382***
(0.0770)
-0.0310**
(0.0128)
-0.00117
(0.00561)
-0.0260**
(0.0105)

-0.0677**
(0.0331)
-0.00939
(0.0193)
-0.0217***
(0.00717)
-0.0315**
(0.0156)

0.00699
(0.00853)
-0.153**
(0.0666)
0.128
(0.0818)
0.0535*
(0.0309)
0.0752**
(0.0349)
0.304***
(0.0786)
-3.238
(2.096)

-0.00800
(0.0109)
-0.460***
(0.0900)
-0.0158
(0.0951)

IMR
Year dummies
Observations
Number of Years

Yes
1,333
26

6.693***
(2.507)
-2.224***
(0.331)
Yes
1,333
26

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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ii. Impact of IMF Lending on Gendered Outcomes
In this section, we present our findings on the impact of the degree of policy conditions assigned
by the IMF on gendered outcomes after having controlled for the endogeneity of IMF participation,
and the selection bias between IMF conditionality and participation using the Heckman selection
procedure (Heckman, 1979).
Results in Table 2 are aligned with the argument of the gender-insensitivity of IMF
programs and the empirical findings of their adverse effects on gendered outcomes in participating
countries (Pandolfelli et al, 2014; Stubbs et al, 2016; Chandra et al, 2018; Saadatmand and
Mcgrath, 2004 and Saadatmand and Toma, 2008).
Column 1 of Table 2 shows a positive and significant relationship between the degree of
conditionality assigned by the IMF and female unemployment rates (Saadatmand and Mcgrath,
2004). These results can be mainly attributed to the downsizing of social expenditures and
privatization policies embedded in IMF programs, which in turn increases the unpaid work burden
of females and decreases their formal employment opportunities. As expected, higher GDP growth
rates and better women's rights protection institutions decrease their unemployment rates as
indicated by the negative and significant coefficients of GDPGR, Law, and CEDAW dummies.
The coefficient of secondary enrollment rates of females is counter-intuitive but can be explained
by the prevailing phenomenon -especially in low- and middle-income countries- of higher
educational attainment of females with stagnantly low female labor force participation and high
female unemployment rates (Assaad et al, 2018).
As for health outcomes, column 2 of Table 2 indicates a positive significant impact of IMF
conditionalities on maternal mortality rates, which was previously obtained by Pandolfelli et al
(2014). The undermined health outcomes of females under structural adjustment programs can be
explained by the decline in health expenditures of borrowing countries due to fiscal austerity
obligations, which in turn compromises the access and affordability of health services to pregnant
women (Stubs et al, 2016). In addition, we can observe that maternal mortality rates increase as
fertility rates increase due to the excess demand for limited health services (Pandolfelli et al, 2014).
The negative and significant coefficient of secondary enrollment rates is expected as higher
educational attainment is expected to delay females’ first birth and increase the period between
subsequent births leading to better health outcomes and lower maternal mortality rates (Krafft and
Sieverding, 2018).
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Table 2
Outcome Equations with Predicted Conditionalities
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Unemployment
Rate

MaternalMortality

Secondary
Enrollment

Gender
Inequality

0.0115***

0.0673**

-0.0684***

0.00829**

(0.00334)

(0.0333)

(0.00694)

(0.00417)

-0.267***

0.02544***

-0.202

0.213***

(0.0580)

(0.600)

(0.136)

(0.0736)

0.145***

-1.386***

-0.165***

(0.0122)

(0.127)

(0.0151)

-0.00602

0.677***

-0.131***

0.0928***

(0.00462)

(0.0477)

(0.00673)

(0.00485)

-0.111***

-0.196

0.0115

0.00997*

(0.0203)

(0.242)

(0.0479)

(0.00544)

-0.00824*

0.0407

-.0000807

-0.0704***

(0.00430)

(0.0438)

(0.0101)

(0.0226)

Constant

0.0443

3.104***

1.115***

0.320***

Year dummies
Region dummies
Observations
Number of Years

(0.0279)
Yes
Yes
965
26

(0.325)
Yes
Yes
799
18

(0.0553)
Yes
Yes
980
26

(0.0334)
Yes
Yes
504
12

Pr (cond)

GDPGR
Sec. Enrollment
Fertility
CEDAW
Law

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Furthermore, the policy conditions assigned by the IMF exhibit an adverse impact on
secondary school enrollment rates of girls (as seen in column 3 in Table 2). These results were
previously obtained in the country-level analysis conducted by Saadatmand and Toma (2008) and
the regional-level analysis conducted by Saadatmand and McGrath (2004). This negative causality
can be explained by the increased workload of young girls inside the household or in the informal
sector due to the deterioration of the economic conditions of households following structural
adjustment. Furthermore, the constrained government's ability to invest in education induces
further gender gaps in educational attainment (Chandra et al, 2018). Additionally, results reveal a
negative and significant impact of fertility rates on secondary school enrollment rates of girls,
which enforces the tri-partite relationship between educational attainment, fertility rates, and
maternal mortality rates (Krafft and Sieverding, 2018).
Finally, Column 4 in Table 2 shows that gender inequality is exacerbated in the presence
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of IMF programs and conditions, and higher fertility rates, while it is reduced with higher
secondary school enrollment rates of girls and the adoption of anti-gender discrimination
conventions. The adverse impact of IMF participation on the gender inequality index comes in line
with the interpretation of Detraz and Peksen (2016) who argue that privatization policies imposed
by the SAPs undermine the governments' ability to protect women's rights, especially on the
economic front. The coefficient of GDP growth is surprising as it indicates a positive and
significant relationship with gender inequality. However, it might be explained by the adverse
effects of early modernization strategies of agricultural transformation and industrialization on
women’s economic and social empowerment earlier explained by Boserup (1970).
Since – to our knowledge - no empirical studies detect the impact of conditionalities on
gendered outcomes, we can interpret the results of Table 2 based on theoretical and factual
grounds. Referring to Figure 5 in section 3, we observe that fiscal policy conditions, public
enterprise reforms, and financial sector reforms constitute around 73.42% of the total
conditionalities imposed by the IMF on lending countries. First, fiscal austerity reforms and
conditionalities introduced by the IMF decrease governments' social, educational, health, and
public spending capacities (Stubbs et al, 2006; Stubbs et al, 2016). This in turn deteriorates the
health and educational outcomes of females, increases their unpaid workload, and lowers their
ability to participate in paid employment opportunities (Antrobus, 1993; Elson, 1991). According
to the "deflationary bias", recessionary pressures force females into the informal employment
sector with lower pay and lower job quality and thus deteriorate their distributional outcomes.
Second, public enterprise and financial sector reforms are different faces of privatization
policies that decrease the decent public employment opportunities for females, which leads to the
deterioration of their economic status. Additionally, the increased prices of health, educational and
social services -due to private sector profit maximization pricing strategies- increase the unpaid
work burden of females and deteriorate their health and educational outcomes (Catagay and Elson,
2000).
iii. Model Extensions
In this section, we extend our analysis to examine whether the presence of an institutional setup to
protect women’s rights (i.e., the presence of a law that prohibits discrimination against women in
the labor market or the country’s ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women) can mitigate the adverse impacts of policy conditions
imposed by the IMF on program participant countries.
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Table 3
An Extended Model with Conditionality-Law Interaction Term
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Unemployment
Rate

MaternalMortality

Secondary
Enrollment

Gender
Inequality

Pr (cond)

0.0222***

0.151***

-0.0340***

0.0410***

GDPGR

(0.00501)
-0.262***

(0.0519)
2.612***

(0.0115)
-0.178

(0.00703)
0.219***

(0.0578)
0.143***
(0.0122)
-0.00660
(0.00461)
-0.111***

(0.599)
-1.397***
(0.127)
0.668***
(0.0478)
-0.169

(0.135)

-0.135***
(0.00676)
0.0103

(0.0713)
-0.173***
(0.0147)
0.0918***
(0.00470)
0.0646***

(0.0202)
0.0118
(0.00819)
-0.0157***
(0.00548)

(0.242)
0.189**
(0.0830)
-0.116**
(0.0553)

(0.0476)
0.0620***
(0.0194)
-0.0490***
(0.0130)

(0.0109)
-0.0590***
(0.0220)
-0.0426***
(0.00749)

Constant

0.0336
(0.0280)

3.000***
(0.328)

1.085***
(0.0555)

0.275***
(0.0333)

Year dummies
Region dummies

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Sec. Enrollment
Fertility
CEDAW
Law
Cond*Law

Observations
965
799
980
Number of Years
26
18
26
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

504
12

First, we add an interaction term between the predicted conditionality and the law dummy
to our outcome equation. Results in Table 3 validate the important role of institutions in mitigating
the negative impact of conditionalities on gendered outcomes. The negative and significant
interaction coefficients for female unemployment, maternal mortality, and gender inequality
equations signal a reduced adverse impact of conditionalities on females in the presence of antidiscrimination law. While the interaction term for school enrollment equation is counter-intuitive
but can be explained by the irrelevance of labor market laws and regulations with school
enrollment rates of girls.

Published by Arab Journals Platform

97

Future Journal of Social Science Vol.1, Issue 1 (May 2022)

Table 4
An Extended Model with Conditionality-CEDAW Interaction Term
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Unemployment
Rate

MaternalMortality

Secondary
Enrollment

Gender
Inequality

0.113***

0.303

-0.392***

0.00697

(0.0438)

(1.556)

(0.103)

(0.141)

-0.261***

2.547***

-0.217

0.213***

(0.0579)

(0.600)

(0.136)

(0.0737)

0.148***

-1.386***

-0.165***

(0.0123)

(0.127)

(0.0151)

-0.00587

0.677***

-0.131***

0.0928***

(0.00461)

(0.0477)

(0.00670)

(0.00486)

0.0555

0.182

-0.519***

-0.0725

(0.0743)

(2.500)

(0.175)

(0.227)

-0.00893**

0.0407

0.00209

0.00997*

(0.00430)

(0.0438)

(0.0101)

(0.00544)

-0.102**

-0.236

0.325***

0.00133

(0.0438)

(1.557)

(0.103)

(0.141)

-0.126

2.727

1.645***

0.322

(0.0781)

(2.510)

(0.177)

(0.228)

Year dummies
Region dummies

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Observations

965

799

980

504

Number of Years

26

18

26

12

Pr (conditionality)

GDPGR
Sec. Enrollment
Fertility
CEDAW
Law
CEDAW.cond
Constant

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In a second step, we add a similar interaction term with the CEDAW dummy. Observing
the results of our extended regression with the conditionality-CEDAW interaction term in Table
4, we can conclude that the ratification of the CEDAW can mitigate the adverse impacts of
conditionalities in unemployment and school enrollment outcomes (as indicated by the significant
interaction coefficients). While it yields insignificant results for maternal mortality rates and
overall gender inequality.
Therefore, we can conclude that institutions play a crucial role in reducing gender gaps.
Thus, a country with stronger institutions for protecting women’s rights is expected to witness a
lower level of deterioration in female outcomes under SAPs. Similar results were obtained by
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Chandra et al (2018) for both the law and CEDAW dummies.
We further check the robustness of our results by first using different outcome
measurements (we replace female unemployment rates with female labor force participation and
secondary enrollment rates of girls by tertiary enrollment rates) to validate that our results are not
specific to the measurements used in the former analysis (Tables A6 in Annex). Second, we reestimate our outcome regression while considering four concessional and non-concessional IMF
lending facilities namely: Extended Fund Facility, Extended Credit Facility, Stand-by
Arrangement, and Stand-by Credit Facility (Table A7 in Annex). Results of our main regression
hold in both checks indicating that IMF austerity policies deteriorate gendered outcomes regardless
of the measurements employed, and in the cases of concessional and non-concessional lending.
To sum up, our main results indicate that the IMF’s decisions are not only limited to the
prevailing macro-economic conditions in the country but are further influenced by politicaleconomic factors. The observation of policy conditions is not random and depends on the IMF
participation in loans (as indicated by the significance of the inverse Mills ratio). Furthermore, a
country's bargaining power for reform programs' intensity merely depends on its current macroeconomic stance. Finally, IMF-imposed policies and reforms have a negative impact on the four
examined gendered outcomes, which might be slightly mitigated in the presence of a strong
institutional setup that prohibits discrimination against women.

VI. Conclusion
“Though IMF programs provide lifelines to governments to help ease their short-term
balance of payment problems, the policy prescriptions that accompany IMF programs
often come with significant political and social costs for both the governments that
implement them and the citizens that experience them” (Detraz and Peksen, 2016).
More precisely, feminist economists criticize the “gender-blind” orthodox policy discourse
imposed by the IMF for disregarding the differential impact of its austerity policies on different
social groups, including females (Beneria, 1982). For the above mentioned, this paper attempts to
examine the impact of IMF programs and subsequent policy conditions from a gender lens
(Saadatmand and Mcgrath, 2004; Saadatmand and Toma, 2008; Stubbs et al, 2016).
To estimate such a causal relationship, we use a world sample of 181 countries for the years
1993 to 2018. Results reveal that a country's GDP, level of foreign exchange reserves, primary
budget balance, and quality of institutions are the main determinants of its demand for participation
in IMF programs. However, power relationships also play a crucial role in such decisions as higher
economic proximity to the veto countries and bigger IMF quotas (and subsequently voting powers)
significantly increase the probability of IMF participation. Second, results denote a country's real
GDP, current account balance, primary budget balance, and institutions as the main determinants
of its assigned degree of policy conditions by the IMF. A better macro-economic stance enhances
a country's bargaining position and reduces its risk of reimbursement default. Furthermore, results
of our outcome regressions indicate that a 1% increase in conditionality increases female
unemployment, maternal mortality rates, girls' secondary school drop-out rates, and overall gender
inequality by 1.1%, 6.7%, 6.8%, and 0.8% respectively. These results confirm the hypotheses of
feminist theories regarding the constraining impact of austerity policies on governments' ability to
provide public services, formal employment opportunities, or protect women's rights (Beneria,
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1982; Antrobus, 1993). These findings are robust to using different education and labor market
proxies, as well as using IMF participation in concessional and non-concessional loans. Finally,
we extend our analysis to detect whether the presence of an institutional setup to protect women's
rights can mitigate the negative impacts of IMF policy conditions on gendered outcomes and the
results validate our hypothesis.
It is suggested for future studies to further incorporate the type of conditionalities into the
analysis, and further disaggregate conditionalities into structural (allocation) and stabilization
conditions. This would allow the detection of the most influential conditionality types on gendered
outcomes, and hence provide more informed recommendations to both the IMF and the loan
recipient governments. Data limitations in our analysis are two-fold. First, the IMF MoNA dataset
only provides a categorical classification of conditionalities assigned to each country with no
quantitative measures or actual implementation indicators. Secondly, data on gender wage gaps
are largely unavailable to run a panel regression that looks further into the evolution of females’
quality of employment not just their magnitudes.
From a policy perspective, our findings of deteriorated gender outcomes mainly stem from
the fact that Bretton Wood institutions adopt strictly orthodox-based reform strategies that rely on
fiscal adjustment and austerity. These policies weaken the state's capacity to invest in femaledominated sectors, provide adequate public services (in terms of quality and quantity) and protect
women’s rights in the labor market. This in turn deteriorates female development outcomes,
especially in emerging countries where females are more likely to participate in the informal sector
markets due to the prevalent male breadwinner bias as proposed by Catagay and Elson (2000).
These programs must thus adopt a more heterodox approach that complements the fiscal
adjustment efforts by a higher number of social and income policies -currently representing less
than 3% of the total conditionalities imposed by the IMF- that outweigh the negative impacts of
austerity reforms on vulnerable groups and considers the social rules of sub-ordinance that
allocates a disproportionate share of unpaid care work to women. For instance, The World
Bank/IMF development committee has assigned the WB to develop some principles to guide social
policy following the Asian financial crisis. Such guidelines were used by the state to implement
well-targeted social welfare and social insurance programs to mitigate the consequences of IMF
programs in south Asia, especially on vulnerable groups including women (World Bank, 1999).
Furthermore, the IMF should consider adding some indicative targets to its programs to guard
females against privatization bias and ensure their continued access to essential services and
opportunities. For example, the IMF yearly program review might monitor some gender-sensitive
indicators including the proportion of females with access to adequately functioning primary
health care clinics, or the percentage of female employment in private sector firms (Elson, 2002).
Finally, in light of our findings on the crucial role that institutions can exert in mitigating
the adverse impacts of IMF policy conditions on females and in accordance with goal number 5
of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, it is recommended for governments of recipient
countries to implement gender-mainstreaming policies (promoted by the United Nations in 1997).
Such strategies ensure that central focus is laid on gender perspectives as well as the implications
of different programs and policies on different social groups, and the achievement of gender
equality. These efforts shall formulate a strong institutional setup in the form of anti-discrimination
public policies, laws, and regulations to protect women’s social and economic rights and promote
their equal participation in all spheres of life.
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Appendix
Table A1
Data Description and Sources
Variable Label
Iit
Condit
GDPGR
Institutions
Reserves (-1)
US trade
EU trade
IMF Quota
Gov. Consumption (-1)
GDP
Current Account (-1)

Description
Source
Dependent Variable: Dummy =1 if country i is an IMF program participant in year t.
MoNA Database by the IMF
Dependent Variable: Number of IMF conditionalities for country i and year t.
MoNA Database by the IMF
Growth Rate of GDP of country i at year t.
WDI, World Bank
Institutions proxied by government effectiveness index in country i a year t.
WGI, World Bank
One year lagged foreign exchange reserves in number of months of imports.
WDI, World Bank
Bilateral trade of County i at year t with the United States.
ITC Trade Map
Bilateral trade of County i at year t with the major western European countries (UK, France, and Germany) ITC Trade Map
IMF Quota of country i at year t.
IMF database (imf.org)
One year lagged Government consumption of country I at year.
WDI, World Bank
Real GDP of country i at year t.
WDI, World Bank
One year lagged Current Account Balance of country i at year t.
WDI, World Bank
One year lagged Budget deficit of country I at year (generated as the difference between government revenues
Primary Budget (-1)
WDI, World Bank
and expenditures).
IMF credit outstanding IMF credit (outstanding) for all members at year t.
MoNA Database by the IMF
FLFP

Dependent Variable: Female Labor Force Participation for country I at year t.

GII

Dependent Variable: Gender Inequality Index for country i at year t (starts in 2010).

Unemployment rate
Dependent Variable: Female unemployment rates for country i at year t.
Secondary & Tertiary
Dependent Variable: Net Secondary Enrollment rates (%, females).
Enrollment
Maternal Mortality RateDependent Variable: Maternal Mortality ratio per 1,000 births.
Fertility
Fertility rates in country i at year t.
CEDAW
Dummy =1 if country i has ratified CEDAW in year t and 0 otherwise.
Law

Presence of a law that prohibits gender discrimination in the labor market in country i.

WDI, World Bank
Human Development Reports (20102018)
WDI, World Bank
WDI, World Bank
WDI, World Bank
WDI, World Bank
UN treaties collection
Women, Business and the law (WBL)
database, World Bank

Source: Constructed by the authors using data sources cited
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Table A2
Types of IMF Lending Facilities
Fund

Facility

GRA

Standby
Agreement (SBA)

PRGT

Standby Credit
Facility (SCF)

GRA

Extended Fund
Facility (EFF)

PRGT

GRA

PRGT

GRA

PRGT

Extended Credit
Facility (ECF)

Flexible Credit
Line (FCL)

Precautionary and
Liquidity Line (PLL)

Purpose

Address short
term or potential
B.O.P
problems

Duration

Lending rate

Repayment

Conditionalities

Special Drawing Rights
(SDR) interest rate + Within 3¼-5 years of
Surcharges per case.
disbursement

Up to
3 years

Zero-interest rate
+ 0.15 percent per year A grace period of
on the undrawn portion four years and a final
of the available amount maturity of eight
every 6 months.
years.

Ex-post disbursement

Special Drawing Rights
Address medium(SDR) interest rate + Within 4½– 10 years
term or
Up to 4 years
Surcharges per case.
of disbursement. Ex-post disbursement (with
protracted BOP
problems because
special emphasis on
Zero-interest rate
of structural
structural reforms to address
3-4 years and (reviewed every two Within 5½ years, and
impediments or
institutional or economic
extendable to 5
years based on
final maturity of 10
slow
weaknesses).
years.
concessional lending
years
growth
interest rates.
Support countries
with already
strong policies to
prevent or
mitigate crises
during times of
heightened risks.

1-2 years

6 months2 years

Special Drawing Rights
Ex-ante (Prior actions) and
(SDR) interest rate +
annual reviews for the 2
Within 3¼ to 5-year.
Surcharges per case.
years arrangement.
Special Drawing Rights
(SDR) interest rate +
Within 3¼ to 5-year.
Surcharges per case.

Ex-ante and Ex-post

Rapid assistance
Outright/
Special Drawing Rights
to countries with
Rapid Financing Instrument
Immediate
(SDR) interest rate +
Within 3¼ to 5 years Ex-ante (Prior actions)
urgent B.O.P.
(RFI)
Purchase
Surcharges per case.
Problems need
including natural
disasters and
Outright/
Within 5½ years, and
domestic
Rapid Credit Facility
Immediate
a final maturity of 10 Ex-ante (program based)
fragilities.
(RCF)
disbursement
Zero-interest rate
years
and Ex-post conditions

Source: Constructed by the author using IMF.org
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Table A3
Forms of IMF Conditionalities
Form of Conditionality

Description

Prior Actions (PAs)

Steps that a lending country must accomplish
before the IMF approves the loan to ensure the basic
milestones for a successful program.

Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPCs)

Measurable indicators
for
macro-economic
variables under the control of the authorities
such as credit and monetary aggregates.

Indicative Targets (ITs)

Targets set for macro-economic indicators to
facilitate the assessment of the progress of the program in
meeting its objectives.

Structural Benchmarks

Non-quantifiable
structural
reforms
that
represent a significant cornerstone for program success

Source: Constructed by the author using IMF.org
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Table A4
Types of IMF Conditionalities
1. General government (fiscal policy)

1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
1.6.
1.7.
1.8.
1.9.

Revenue measures, excluding trade policy
Revenue administration, including customs
Expenditure measures, including arrears clearance
Combined expenditure and revenue measures
Debt Management
Expenditure auditing, accounting, and financial controls
Fiscal transparency (publication, parliamentary oversight)
Budget preparation (e.g., submission or approval)
Inter-governmental relations

2. Central Bank (Monetary Policy)

2.1. Central bank operations and reforms
2.2. Central bank auditing, transparency, and financial controls
3. Civil service and public employment reforms, and wages
4. Pension and other social sector reforms

4.1. Pension reforms
4.2. Other social sector reforms (e.g., social safety nets, health, and education)
5. Public enterprise reform and pricing (non-financial sector)

5.1. Public enterprise pricing and subsidies
5.2. Privatization, public enterprise reform, and restructuring, other than pricing
5.3. Price controls and marketing restrictions
6. Financial sector

6.1. Financial sector legal reforms, regulation, and supervision
6.2. Restructuring and privatization of financial institutions
7. Exchange systems and restrictions (current and capital)
8. International trade policy, excluding customs reforms
9. Labor markets, excluding public sector employment
10. Economic statistics (excluding fiscal and central bank transparency and similar
measures)
11. Other structural measures

11.1.
11.2.
11.3.
11.4.

Private sector legal and regulatory environment reform (non-financial sector)
Natural resource and agricultural policies (excl. public enterprises and pricing)
PRSP development and implementation
Anti-corruption legislation/policy

Source: Constructed by the author using IMF’s MoNA dataset
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Table A5
List of Countries used in Estimation
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Antigua and
Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh.
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize.
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Belarus
Belize
Brazil
Brunei-Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cape Verde
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central- African
Republic

Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Congo, Democratic
Rep.
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominic
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Eswatini Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
The Gambia
Georgia

Kyrgyz
Germany
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Iraq
Ireland
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea
Kuwait
Lao
Latvia
Lebanon Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg

Madagascar
Malawi Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshal
Island
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New-Zealand
Niger
North Macedonia
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua
New
Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines

Poland
Portugal Romania
Russia
Rwanda
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United-Arab Emirates

United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga

Source: Constructed by the author using IMF’s MoNA dataset
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Table A6
Outcome Regression with Alternative Measurements of Gendered Outcomes
(1)
FLFP
Pr (conditionality)

(2)
Tertiary
Enrollment

-0.0185***
(0.00606)
0.118
(0.105)
-0.0575***
(0.0222)
0.264***
(0.0367)
0.00724
(0.00838)
0.0193**
(0.00780)
0.347***
(0.0505)

-0.0173*
(0.0100)
-0.00377**
(0.00180)

Year dummies
Region dummies

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Observations
Number of Years

965
26

903
26

GDPGR
Sec. Enrollment
Fertility
CEDAW
Law
Constant

-0.0566
(0.0731)
-0.109***
(0.0141)
0.0388***
(0.0143)
0.655***
(0.0882)

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7
Outcome Regression with Concessional and Non-concessional Loans

Pr (conditionality)
GDPGR
Sec. Enrollment
Fertility
CEDAW
Law
Constant
Year dummies
Region dummies
Observations
Number of Years

(1)
Unemployment
Rate
0.0121***
(0.00324)
-0.259***
(0.0580)
0.145***
(0.0122)
-0.00634
(0.00460)
-0.110***
(0.0203)
-0.00864**
(0.00429)
0.0424
(0.0278)
Yes
Yes
1,240
26

(2)
MaternalMortality
0.0658**
(0.0321)
0.0258***
(0.00601)
-1.390***
(0.127)
0.677***
(0.0475)
-0.186
(0.242)
0.0384
(0.0437)
3.093***
(0.325)
Yes
Yes
1,098
18

(4)
Secondary
Enrollment
-0.0669***
(0.00675)
-0.239*
(0.136)

-0.133***
(0.00668)
0.00456
(0.0479)
0.00220
(0.0101)
1.132***
(0.0553)
Yes
Yes
1,310
26

(3)
Gender
Inequality
0.00786**
(0.00398)
0.217***
(0.0738)
-0.165***
(0.0151)
0.0931***
(0.00480)
-0.0696***
(0.0226)
0.00971*
(0.00542)
0.317***
(0.0334)
Yes
Yes
646
12

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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